The Metropolitan Edison Co. provides an essential public service to the residents of York, Pennsylvania. It is the only public or private entity authorized to provide electrical services to most of the municipality. As part of its articles of association with the company, the state imposes extensive regulations and cooperates with the company in various ways. In addition, the state has given its consent to the termination of the company`s mode of service – exactly the conduct that is being challenged here. If I take these factors together, I have no difficulty finding state action in this case. As the Court held in Burton v Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 365 U.S. 725 (1961), the State implicitly rejected the Court`s argument on several occasions. See, for example, Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. P.
3, 109 U. P. 8 (1883). It`s hard to imagine a regulated activity that is more important or “more concerned with the public interest” than the maintenance of schools, but we have in Evans v. Newton, 382 U. pp. 296, 382 U. p. 300 (1966): I agree with my brother BRENNAN that this matter is a very bad way to resolve difficult and important questions. that are being requested today.
The confusing sequence of events leading to the impugned dismissal makes it unclear whether the applicant has a property right under State law in the service she declared by Brandeis J. in Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517 (1933), on competition between states to facilitate opportunities and methods of integration: “The race was not a race of stagecoach, but of negligence.” Id. at 288 U. S. 559 (dissenting opinion). One need only read the Federal Trade Commission`s 84-part report on utilities (headed by its able adviser, the late Robert E.
Healy) to see that government regulation of public services has largely made state commissions prisoners of public services. See in particular S.Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 73-A (1936); and see id. pt. 72-A, p. 880. In this context, it should be noted that successful attempts by public utilities to exclude themselves from antitrust laws were based on the assertion that their monopolistic activity constituted “state action”.
See Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 250-252 (CA4 1971); Gas Light Co. of Columbus v Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1138-1140 (CA5 1971). See 343 U.S. to 343 U.S. 462. At one point, the Court noted that the difficulty inherent in this type of economic analysis discourages natural monopolies from the scope of state policy principles. To initiate an investigation into whether a particular state-sanctioned monopoly could have survived without explicit state permission, petitioner Catherine Jackson is a York resident who has received electricity from the respondent in the past. Until September 1970, the petitioner received electrical services at her York home under an account with the respondent in her own name. When his account was terminated due to alleged arrears, a new account was opened with the defendant in the name of James Dodson, another resident of the residence, and service at the residence was resumed. There is a dispute as to whether payments from the Dodson Account for services rendered during this period were ever made.
In August 1971, Dodson left the residence. After that, the service continued, but no payment was made. The petitioner states that no invoices were received during this period. All of the applicant`s arguments, taken together, show nothing more than the fact that Metropolitan was a highly regulated private public utility that enjoyed, at least in part, a monopoly on the provision of electricity services in its territory, and that it had chosen to terminate service to the applicants in a manner that the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission considered permitted under state law. In our decision, this is not sufficient to bind the State of Pennsylvania to the defendant`s claim, so its conduct is imputable to the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Anangestellte Abt. v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225 (1956).
While the Court did not conclude that state action is based solely on the transfer of a monopoly by the state, it did note that the monopoly factor weighs heavily in determining whether constitutional obligations can be formally imposed on private entities. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U., p. 192 (1944). In fact, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 407 U.S. 177 (1972), the court carefully pointed out that Pennsylvania`s liquor licensing system is “far from giving club licensees a monopoly on the supply of liquor in a particular community or state.” Ms Jackson finds in that provision a statutory right of the State to continue the pension service up to her place of residence. He argues that under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, she cannot be deprived of this entitlement without reasonable notice and without a hearing before an impartial body: until such time as these are completed, her service must continue.
Based on our conclusion on the preliminary question of state action, we do not question the existence of a property right or the procedural safeguards that the Fourteenth Amendment would require if a property right were established. A)Parent-child relationshipB) Parent-adoptive-child relationship)Sibling relationships)Marital relations Private parties performing functions that affect the public interest can often convincingly claim to be exempt from the constitutional requirements that apply to state institutions because it is important to maintain a private sector in which the possibility of individual choice is maximized. See Evans v. Newton, op. cit. cit., 382 U. 298; H. Friendly, The Dartmouth College Case and the Public-Private Penumbra (1969).
The maintenance of the private status of parochial schools, cited by the majority, promotes precisely this value. In the area of good practice, a similar value of diversity can often be fostered by giving different private entities the flexibility to choose practices that meet their specific needs. See Wahba v. New York University, 492 F.2d 96, 102 (CA2), certificate denied, post, p. 874. But it is hard to imagine such interests being promoted by protecting private public services from compliance with the constitutional norms that would apply if the companies were state-owned. The values of pluralism and diversity are the company. Id. at 365 U. S. 725.
However, we cautioned that while “various relationships may fall within the scope of the constitutional amendment for some,” differences in circumstances lead to legal differences and limit beneficial ownership of public property to tenants. Id. at 365 U. S. 726. PER BRENNAN J.A., deviant, paragraph in 419 U. p. 364, concludes that there is no justiciable controversy between the applicant and the defendant, since the right to service has already been terminated by the defendant in accordance with its tariff. We do not believe that this is less a finding on the merits of the action than our conclusion that the deprivations she may have suffered were not caused by the state. Whether a claim asserted is “property” within the meaning of the due process clause, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.
S. 564 (1972), and if so, his deprivation was due process, see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. p. 134 (1974), are in themselves constitutional questions for which we see no reason in this case. Pennsylvania is not sufficiently related to the impugned termination to impute the defendant`s conduct to the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, since the petitioner has no further demonstrated that the defendant was a highly regulated private service with a partial monopoly and that it chose to terminate the service in a manner that the Commission found admissible under national law. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. P. 163.
Public Utilities Comm`n v. Pollak, 343 U. p. 451; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715. pp. 419 U. pp.
349-359. On October 6, 1971, Metropolitan employees came to the residence and inquired about Dodson`s current address. The petitioner stated that this was unknown to her. The next day, another employee went to the apartment and told the petitioner that the meter had been manipulated to prevent the quantities used. She denied knowledge and requested that her home`s service account be moved from Dodson`s name to that of Robert Jackson, who was later identified as her 12-year-old son. Four days later, on October 11, 1971, Metropolitan employees interrupted their service without further notice to the petitioner. We were dealing with the exercise by the Metropolitan of certain powers conferred on him by the State, traditionally associated with sovereignty, such as the eminent domain, our case would be quite different. But while Pennsylvania law imposes an obligation to provide services to regulated utilities, it does not impose such an obligation on the state. Pennsylvania courts have rejected the contention that the provision of public services is either a state function or a municipal function. Girard Life Insurance Co.
v. City of Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 393 (1879); Baily v.